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TRANSFORMING FEDERAL AND STATE RETIREMENT 
TAX DEDUCTIONS TO REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 
 
Teresa Ghilarducci* and Ismael Cid-Martinez** 
 
The purpose of this Study is to calculate retirement account 
tax expenditures by states.  States with income taxes that allow tax 
deferral of retirement account contributions and investment 
earnings lose nearly $20 billion in revenue.  This Study uses a 
variety of data sources, including state reports from their executive 
agencies and known estimation techniques to calculate the amount 
of tax credits that a worker in each state would receive if the 
deferrals were converted to a refundable tax credit.  The average 
credit under these estimation techniques and calculations would 
be $172. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Bernard and Irene Schwartz Chair in Economic Policy Analysis, The New School for 
Social Research, New York, New York. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article presents the first study to calculate how much 
states spend in foregone tax revenue to prop up the nation’s 
failing retirement system.  Despite over $120 billion in federal 
and state taxpayer subsidies for retirement savings projected 
each year for the next ten years,1 the nation faces a retirement 
income crisis.  Though the base layer of household retirement 
income (Social Security) is solid, the targets of federal and state 
retirement account tax subsidies—voluntary workplace 
retirement plans such as defined benefit (DB) and defined 
contribution (DC) plans—are insufficient and eroding.2  In the 
forty years since they were first established, 401(k) plans have 
virtually replaced DB plans in the private sector.3  The system of 
voluntary, tax-favored retirement accounts has failed to produce 
adequate account balances for the workers who have accounts, 
and has failed to extend coverage to over half of the workforce who 
do not have accounts.4 
A household’s retirement savings comes from three places: 
the worker, the employer, and the government.5  The federal 
government and, increasingly, state governments subsidize 
retirement savings in the form of tax deductions and deferrals—
not refundable tax credits.6  As this article illustrates, over 80% 
 
 1.  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 
2016, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 226 (2015), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf 
[hereinafter OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET]. 
 2.  Teresa Ghilarducci & Joelle Saad-Lessler, Explaining the Decline in the Offer 
Rate of Employer Retirement Plans Between 2003 and 2012, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV., 807, 807-08 (2015). 
 3.  Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and 
Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69 SOC. SEC. 
BULLETIN 3 (2009). 
 4.  Ghilarducci & Saad-Lessler, supra note 2, at 808-09. 
 5.  The government provides tax deductions to qualified taxpayers for retirement 
accounts. Many employers contribute to their employees’ defined contribution or 
defined benefit plans. And employees directly contribute to DC plans.  See JASON 
FURMAN, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER & 
THE CONCORD COALITION, REMARKS ON RETIREMENT SECURITY 1 (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/remarks_on_social_security_and_
retirement_security_jf_10.23.13.pdf; see also Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings: 
Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 6.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., 2D SESS., JCX-97-14, 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 4 (2014) 
[hereinafter J. COMM. ON TAXATION]. 
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of the tax subsidies for retirement accounts come from the federal 
government; yet, the share of state indirect spending on 
retirement plans is significant and not well appreciated or 
known.7  The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) use different methodologies to 
calculate the size of the tax expenditures.8  In 2014, the JCT 
calculated a federal retirement tax expenditure of $94.6 billion, 
and calculates $805.1 billion for the next five years (2014-2018).9  
The OMB estimates for the same expenditures are $146.4 billion 
for 2014 and $828.5 billion for 2014-2018.10  We use the more 
conservative JCT method to value state retirement tax subsidies 
in this paper, in order to not bias our estimates upwards—not 
because one methodology is superior to the other. 
Using the JCT’s conservative method, we find that the size of 
the states’ subsidies to the voluntary retirement account system 
is substantial: nearly $20 billion in 2014.  Despite their size, 
however, state retirement account subsidies are rarely 
discussed.11  This article represents a first attempt to measure the 
tax expenditures for retirement accounts at the state level.  One 
reason that state tax expenditures for retirement accounts have 
not been analyzed is because state reports are inconsistent, at 
best, if they exist at all.12  For example, three states do not publish 
tax expenditure reports and only eighteen states itemize their 
retirement tax expenditures.  As such, our reported total is 
derived mainly through estimation. 
We conclude that, without federal or state treasuries having 
to forgo additional revenue each year, all working Americans 
could have a retirement account if the preferential treatment was 
a refundable tax credit and not a deduction.  If such treatment 
 
 7.  We estimate that states spent over $20 billion in 2014 on tax subsidies for 
retirement accounts. If we add this figure to the federal retirement tax expenditure 
estimate of $94.6 billion for the same year, we arrive at total retirement tax 
expenditure of over $114 billion in 2014—with federal tax subsidies for retirement 
accounts making up more than 80% of the total.  See Ghilarducci et al., Retirement 
Savings Tax Expenditures: The Need for Refundable Tax Credits, SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR 
ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS (June 2015), 
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/
Retirement_Savings_Tax_Expenditures.pdf. 
 8.  See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
 9.  Id. at 32. 
 10.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 226. 
 11.  See Michael Leachman et. al., Promoting State Budget Accountability 
Through Tax Expenditure Reporting, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 7-8 (May 
2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-11-11sfp.pdf 
 12.  Id. at 3-4. 
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occurred, more than eighty million more workers in 2015 would 
have had a retirement account, and the refundable tax credits 
would have been about $800 to each taxpayer.13  Further, if the 
tax deduction had been a refundable tax credit protected from 
early withdrawal, the distribution of the subsidy would have been 
progressive and coverage universal.  As a result, the median 
retirement account balance in this country would be over $70,000, 
instead of zero.14 
This article is divided into four Parts.  Part I introduces the 
concept of tax expenditures.  Part II describes the relationship 
between U.S. savings policies and tax favoritism.  Part III 
discusses how retirement tax expenditures are both effective in 
raising retirement savings and highly regressive.  Part IV 
discusses conversion of retirement deductions and deferrals to 
credits that can be directly deposited in guaranteed retirement 
accounts.  The Appendix to this article describes the methodology 
used in computing state tax expenditures. 
II. RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES AND SAVINGS 
This Part is divided into three parts.  Part A. provides an 
overview of retirement savings policy in the United States.  Part 
B. discusses the size of the federal retirement tax expenditures, 
and Part C. discusses the size of the, until now, hidden state 
retirement tax expenditures. 
 
  
 
 13.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 1 (dividing the total tax expenditure 
by the number of taxpayers). 
 14.  We assume that each worker would receive a combined credit of $819, which 
would be deposited directly into a retirement savings account. If this process of 
reinvestment was fast-forwarded for forty years of employment, assuming an 
annualized rate of return of 3.5%, the average worker in the United States not 
participating in a retirement plan at work would save approximately $72,489.  See 
generally Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 4, 6, 16.  Households near retirement 
(ages 55-64) and without an employer-sponsored retirement plan had a median 
balance of zero in retirement savings as of 2012. See Joelle Saad-Lessler et al., Are 
U.S. Workers Ready for Retirement? Trends in Plan Sponsorship, Participation, and 
Preparedness, SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS (2015), 
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/Are
_US_Workers_Ready_for_Retirement.pdf, [hereinafter Are U.S. Workers Ready for 
Retirement?]. 
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A. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
POLICY 
The federal and state governments have played a major role 
in the funding and distributional equity of the nation’s retirement 
system for over 100 years.15  At the early part of the 20th century, 
three trends shaped United States retirement policy: (1) federal, 
state, and municipal public sector retirement plans were 
expanded alongside the railroad retirement system; (2) Social 
Security was established for almost all workers; and (3) the 
income tax code became an important tool for the government to 
incentivize public and private employers and their workers to 
save for retirement.16 
The use of the tax code to promote prefunded retirement 
plans dates back over ninety years17 to the 1921 Revenue Act,18 
which eliminated current taxation of employer stock bonuses and 
profit sharing plans, and eventually pension trusts.  Later, the 
1942 Revenue Act19 dramatically increased corporate income tax 
rates during World War II.20  At the same time, corporations were 
exempt from these taxes if they engaged in activities that served 
a social purpose21—payment in the form of deferred compensation 
or in the form of employee benefits.  Payment in such forms of 
compensation helped curb inflation and provide social insurance 
on the job through health insurance, vacation funds, disability 
insurance pools, and retirement plans.22 
The 1942 Revenue Act raised revenue to be sure.  However, 
it also initiated the modern era of the United States Government 
using the income tax system as a tool to induce more retirement 
savings for workers and employers.23  Therefore, both the federal 
 
 15.  See generally Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Death and Taxes: 
Can We Fund For Retirement Between Them?, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 126, 128-29 (Ray Schmitt ed., 1993); see also Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 
136, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921). 
 16.  See generally DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT: AN AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1880-1990 6-31 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1998), 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6108.  
 17.  Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 15, at 128-29. 
 18.  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921). 
 19.  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (1942). 
 20.  COSTA, supra note 16, at 17. 
 21.  Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for 
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN L. REV. 23, 42-44 (2006). 
 22.  TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
PRIVATE PENSIONS 45 (MIT Press Ed., 1992). 
 23.  Id. at 35, 153. 
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government and the states have long been committed to the goal 
of retirement income security.  This is because, under our welfare 
state system of providing universal social insurance through 
private markets, providing tax incentives to employers and 
workers to set up voluntary retirement savings vehicles was the 
most important tool to achieve that goal. 
In 1974, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act24 
was established in order for Congress to keep track of the amount 
of money that the federal government was spending, indirectly, to 
provide public goods.25  The Act required calculations of tax 
expenditures to be included in the federal budget.26  Many states 
have not been fastidious in their reporting or assessment of the 
fairness and effectiveness of the retirement account tax 
expenditures.27  Tax expenditures are made up of special tax 
exclusions and deferrals for retirement savings accounts, and are 
referred to as “tax expenditures” because the revenue losses to the 
federal or state treasury are analogous to direct spending 
programs.28 
Income tax rules without special preferences for retirement 
savings would mean that employer and employee contributions to 
qualified retirement and pension plans, and the earnings from 
these assets, would all be taxed as ordinary income.  The current 
net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings allow 
taxpayers to exclude employer or individual retirement 
contributions from their gross income, and to defer taxes on the 
contributions and the investment-income earned on these savings 
until money is withdrawn.29  Among these qualified retirement 
vehicles are 401(k) plans, traditional Individual Retirement 
Arrangements (IRAs), Roth IRAs (with tax subsidy granted upon 
withdrawal), DB plans, and DC plans. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation report (JCT Report), 
 
 24.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974). 
 25.  Id. at § 2. 
 26.  Id. at § 102. 
 27.  Leachman et. al., supra note 11, at 32. 
 28.  J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 2. 
 29.  26 I.R.C. § 415 (2012) (providing for dollar limitations on benefits and 
contributions under qualified retirement plans). For example, the limitation for 
defined contribution plans under I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) was $52,000 in 2014. See IRS 
Announces 2014 Pension Plan Limitations; Taxpayers May Contribute up to $17,500 
to Their 401(k) Plans in 2014, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations%3B-
Taxpayers-May-Contribute-up-to-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014.  
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“Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014-
2018,” begins with the baseline that all compensation to 
employees is subject to ordinary income tax.30  The revenue that 
would have been collected—if the tax code did not specifically 
exclude the income—is the tax expenditure.31  Specific exclusions 
for employer-provided benefits include coverage under disability 
and health insurance and group-term life insurance, among many 
others.  Each exclusion is classified as a tax expenditure in the 
annual reports.32  However, treatment of employer contributions 
to pension plans, income earned on pension assets, and worker 
contributions to DC plans and IRAs are deferred.33  The federal 
(and some states’) tax codes allow employer contributions to 
qualified pension plans, and require that employee contributions 
are not to be taxed until distributed to the employee (either before 
or at retirement).34  The JCT Report elaborates that “[t]he tax 
expenditure for ‘net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings’ is computed as the income taxes forgone on current tax-
excluded pension contributions and earnings less the income 
taxes paid on current pension distributions (including the 10-
percent additional tax paid on early withdrawals from pension 
plans).”35 
Tax expenditures for DB and DC plans that had been in place 
for years showed a larger rate of increase in 1983; the same year 
in which Congress and President Ronald Reagan not only raised 
the FICA tax, but also cut future Social Security benefits at each 
eligible age of collection by gradually raising the “normal 
retirement age” from sixty five to sixty seven.36  The expansion of 
tax expenditures through exclusions goes against well-
established public finance principles that, all things being equal, 
an efficient tax code is one that expands the tax base and keeps 
tax rates low.  This is because high tax rates produce distortions 
in prices and behavior.37  But, exclusions and deductions work in 
 
 30.  J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 10. 
 31.  Id. at 2. 
 32.  Id. at 4. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. (JCT does not take into account any behavioral changes or other tax 
consequences that might happen if special tax treatment did not exist). 
 36.  See John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: 
Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 7, July 
1983, at 3, 12. 
 37.  RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 49 (Bonnie E. Lieberman & James B. Armstrong eds., 3d ed. 1980); see 
GHILARDUCCIFINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2016  7:54 AM 
96     BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.1 
the opposite direction: they narrow the tax base and, thus, require 
higher tax rates to keep revenue constant.38 
One unfortunate consequence of using tax deductions as a 
lever to induce socially acceptable behavior—behavior that 
advances the goals of social policy—is that the progressive income 
tax system produces an upside-down distribution of subsidies.  
That is, rather than steer subsidies to the households in need of 
the most help and that are the most sensitive to the 
encouragement, the greater subsidies go to the households with a 
higher marginal tax rate.39  Further, households with high 
marginal tax rates consist of taxpayers in higher brackets who 
can afford to defer more consumption until retirement (and are in 
less need of the incentive or financial help from the government) 
than households in the lower tax brackets.  The more a taxpayer 
saves, and the higher the tax bracket under which that taxpayer 
falls, the greater the subsidy from a federal and state deferral of 
taxes on retirement plan contributions, and the greater the 
buildup in those funds.  Not everyone agrees that the upside-down 
nature of the subsidies is a problem.  The Employee Benefit 
Research Institute (EBRI) provides a technical explanation that 
the taxpayers with the highest incomes derive the greatest 
benefits because the benefit is proportionate to their income and 
effort.40 
Here is a simplified example of how the tax deferral works as 
a subsidy: let us imagine the case of a barista who earns $1,000 
per month and who faces a (hypothetical) marginal tax rate of 
12%.  Our barista would pay $120 in taxes, which means she is 
left with $880 of after-tax income.  If, instead, she contributes 
$100 to a qualified retirement plan, her taxable income would be 
lower, at $900.  With only $108 due in taxes now, our barista 
would be left with less after-tax-income—$792 versus $880—but 
she will also have $100 in a retirement plan and will have saved 
 
generally Batchelder et al., supra note 21, at 48. 
 38.  Andrew Chamberlain & Patrick Fleenor, America’s Shrinking Income Tax 
Base Requires Higher Rates for Everyone, TAX FOUNDATION (Sept. 21, 2005), 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/americas-shrinking-income-tax-base-requires-
higher-rates-everyone. 
 39.  This assertion is merely mathematical. A person who deducts 1 dollar of 
qualified spending and is at a 39% marginal tax rate is allowed to not pay 39 cents in 
taxes they otherwise would owe. But a person in a 15% tax bracket is only allowed to 
not pay 15 cents in taxes otherwise owed. The person in the highest bracket gets the 
largest tax break. The regressive nature of the subsidy is upside down. See Fast Facts: 
Are 401(k) Tax Preferences Upside Down?, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/FF.244.Up-Down.29Aug131.pdf. 
 40.  Id.   
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$12 on her tax bill.  Whatever investment gains are made on her 
retirement account would also be tax free.41  Moreover, when our 
barista collects the money for retirement in the future, her income 
will be taxed at a rate presumably lower than 12%.42  This is the 
case because, by and large, retirees earn less income and thus, 
face a lower tax liability than they did during their years of 
employment.43  If we assume a case of zero growth, and a lower 
tax rate at retirement, our barista’s initial $100 contribution 
would pay a tax of $6.  This leaves her with a larger net worth (of 
$886) than she would otherwise have without contributing to a 
retirement account ($880).44 
B. SIZE OF FEDERAL RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES 
Retirement tax expenditures are among the three largest 
federal tax expenditures.45  Total federal retirement plan tax 
expenditures were $94.6 billion in 2014, with spending on DC 
plans, such as 401(k) plans, making up the largest share.46  The 
costs of these tax subsidies are also projected to increase such 
that, between 2014 and 2018, the federal cost of retirement tax 
expenditures is projected to be $805.1 billion (see Table 1).47 
 
  
 
 41.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 220-21. 
 42.  See Teresa Ghilarducci & Adam Hayes, 401(k) Tax Policy Creates Inequality, 
SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS (2015), 
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/Ha
yes_Ghilarducci_Policy_Note_1.9.15_FINAL.pdf 
 43.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 1-2, 17. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See generally J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 36. 
 46.  In 2014, defined contribution plans accounted for 47% of the total cost of all 
tax expenditures; define benefit plans 28%, traditional IRAs 13%, Keogh plans 6%, 
Roth IRAs 5%, and special credits 1%. See id.   
 47.  We are reporting low estimates of the tax expenditure. Please see the 
appendix for a discussion of the range of estimates based on different methodologies 
and assumptions.   
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TABLE 1. FEDERAL RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES (IN 
BILLIONS)48 
 
Function 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014-
2018 
Keogh Plans 5.8 8.7 10.0 11.4 16.2 52.1 
DB Plans 26.0 41.3 50.4 61.2 69.4 248.3 
DC Plans 44.9 62.3 81.2 98.9 111.7 399.0 
Traditional 
IRAs 
11.8 12.8 13.9 15.0 16.0 69.5 
Roth IRAs 4.9 5.5 6.1 6.6 7.2 30.2 
Special 
Credits 
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 6.0 
Total 94.6 131.8 162.8 194.3 222.1 805.1 
 
Table 1, above, provides a breakdown of the cost of retirement 
expenditures by type and year.  Of the total cost of retirement tax 
expenditures in 2014, $5.8 billion accounted for preferential 
treatment to plans covering partners and sole proprietors (e.g., 
Keogh Plans), $26.0 billion for the more traditional DB plans, 
$44.9 billion for DC plans, and almost $17 billion for both 
traditional and Roth IRAs combined.  With additional credits for 
certain elective deferrals and IRA contributions (special credits) 
making up more than $1 billion in 2014, the total cost of 
retirement tax expenditures amounted to $94.6 billion in 2014.  
This amount, as can be seen above, is projected to increase every 
year—to reach $222.1 billion by 2018. 
Leveraging the tax code to achieve social goals escapes the 
scrutiny of annual evaluation.  Unlike discretionary spending, 
revenue losses from the tax breaks are rarely debated.  There is a 
built-in tendency for tax expenditure subsidies to grow without 
review or accountability, which is a constant theme of the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the government’s 
neutral accounting and auditing agency.49  As part of the annual 
budgeting cycle in Congress, the United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations (Appropriations 
Committee) considers funding for all types of discretionary 
 
 48.  J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 32. 
 49.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL 
FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 18 (Sept. 2005). 
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spending; but, tax expenditures, mandatory spending, and net 
interest payments are not reviewed during the annual budget 
process.50  In this sense, tax expenditures are entitlements 
because they do not end automatically, and, rather, it is the 
number and intensity of tax units who participate in the preferred 
activity that ultimately determines the amount of spending, just 
like with Social Security and Medicare.51 
The government’s large and indirect, but real, effect in 
boosting household savings is starkly appreciated when 
comparing the size of the tax expenditure for retirement savings 
to actual savings.  Federal tax expenditures for pensions and 
retirement accounts as a share of personal savings has risen 
sharply since 1974 and has remained in the 16% to 20% range for 
the past fifty years.52  To illustrate, the ratio of the retirement tax 
expenditure to personal savings was 5% in 1974, 21% in 1984, 
20% in 2004, and 16% in 2011 (see Figure 1).53  When we add state 
tax expenditures for retirement savings ($20 billion in 2014), the 
total amount of tax expenditures in 2014 ($114 billion) amounted 
to more than one-sixth of total savings—$633 billion in 2014.54  
Yet, the savings rate, which is the ratio of savings to personal 
income, has not been enhanced by this growing rate of tax 
expenditures.  Instead, it has decreased; in 1974, the savings rate 
was 12.9%, in 1994, it was 6.3%, and in 2014 it was 4.9%.55 
 
  
 
 50.  See Sima J. Gandhi, Audit the Tax Code: Doing What Works for Tax 
Expenditures, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (Apr. 2010), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_tax_framing.pdf. 
 51.  Because tax expenditures resemble mandatory spending in this sense, they 
have often being called “the hidden entitlements.” See Tax Expenditures – The Hidden 
Entitlements, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE 1-2 (May 1996), 
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/hident.pdf. 
 52.  See Personal Saving, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ECON. RES. FED. RES. 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2015), 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/A071RC1A027NBEA. 
 53.  See id.   
 54.  Id.   
 55.  Id.   
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FIGURE 1. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONAL SAVINGS, 1974-201156 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the sharp increase in the cost of retirement 
tax expenditures expressed as a share of total personal savings.  
By 1984, the cost of retirement expenditures—as a share of total 
personal savings—was four times that of the cost in the 1970s.  
The cost of retirement tax expenditures has remained within the 
16% to 20% range of all personal savings since this sharp rise of 
the 1980s.  As this chart aptly illustrates, the government is a 
major partner in household savings. 
C. STATE LEVEL EXPENDITURES FOR RETIREMENT 
Because the cost of tax expenditures are most often opaque, 
we doubt many governors, treasurers, and legislators realize the 
extent of the losses to the state treasuries that exist from adopting 
the federal tax provisions.  State tax expenditures, resulting from 
 
 56.  See generally Interactive Data, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. 
ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/itable/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) [hereinafter 
BEA] (for JCT 2011 and NIPA accounts from the BEA).  See also STAFF OF J. COMM. 
ON TAXATION, JCX-15-11, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 
AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES: SCHEDULED FOR PUB. 
HEARING BEFORE S. COMM. ON FIN. MAR. 1, 2011 20-25(2011). 
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conformity with federal tax law, are called “implicit tax 
expenditures.”57  Since states often piggyback on federal tax 
provisions for administrative simplicity, for retirement 
preferential treatment alone, we estimate that they forgo nearly 
$20 billion of revenue each year.58 
In 2014, the largest states incurred the highest tax 
expenditures.  California and New York led the pack with $5.2 
billion and $2.8 billion tax expenditures in annual tax revenues.  
And, both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts forgo more than $1 
billion dollars each year in revenue due to the costs of their 
retirement expenditures (see Table 2).59 
 
TABLE 2. RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES, NATIONAL AND 
STATE (2014)60 
 
State Total Tax Retirement Account 
Expenditure (2014) 
United States (Federal) $94,600,000,000 
All States $19,910,797,336 
Alabama $112,785,823 
Arizona $121,002,756 
Arkansas $51,800,446 
California $5,170,000,000 
Colorado $209,132,532 
Connecticut $205,397,511 
Delaware $35,398,530 
Georgia $711,000,000 
Hawaii $80,737,496 
Idaho  $45,988,492 
Illinois $498,959,734 
Indiana $152,352,803 
 
 57.  Leachman et. al., supra note 11, at 14. 
 58.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 1-2. 
 59.  States without an income tax are Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, 
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. New Hampshire and Tennessee collect an income 
tax, which applies to interest and dividend income only. The appendix describes the 
calculation methodology.  See id. at 3. See also Chris Kahn, State with No Income Tax: 
Better or Worse?, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/taxes/state-with-
no-income-tax-better-or-worse-1.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
 60.  Calculations are based on individual state tax expenditure reports and 
developed estimates. See infra Appendix for details.   
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Iowa $520,000,000 
Kansas $78,363,652 
Kentucky $539,000,000 
Louisiana $92,289,333 
Maine $162,000,000 
Maryland  $293,558,700 
Massachusetts $1,060,000,000 
Michigan $946,000,000 
Minnesota $881,000,000 
Mississippi $48,414,308 
Missouri $151,229,468 
Montana $159,000,000 
Nebraska $114,446,275 
New Jersey $350,615,243 
New Mexico $32,187,460 
New York $2,826,000,000 
North Carolina $914,000,000 
North Dakota $15,627,995 
Ohio $256,043,750 
Oklahoma $63,555,342 
Oregon $411,000,000 
Pennsylvania $1,100,300,000 
Rhode Island $41,846,348 
South Carolina $121,189,494 
Utah $92,421,733 
Vermont $37,829,036 
Virginia $303,532,120 
West Virginia $47,690,959 
Wisconsin $730,100,000 
District of Columbia $127,000,000 
 
Table 2 provides the total cost of retirement tax expenditures 
at the state and federal levels.  This Study is the first to measure 
the tax expenditures for retirement accounts for all states in the 
United States (including Washington, D.C.) that have an income 
tax on earnings.  Table 2 shows that, in aggregate, states spend 
nearly $20 billion in preferential treatment for qualified 
retirement accounts.  Eleven states, of the forty-two listed above, 
forgo more than half-a-billion dollars each in revenue as a result 
of this preferential treatment. 
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III. RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES ARE BOTH 
INEFFECTIVE IN RAISING RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
AND HIGHLY REGRESSIVE 
Tax subsidies for retirement accounts are intended to cajole 
individuals to save for retirement tomorrow, rather than to 
consume today.61  But, experts have concluded that deductions for 
retirement plans are not effective in encouraging workers or 
households to save more.62  Retirement tax expenditures are 
regressive and largely ineffective because access to retirement 
plans is skewed towards those at the higher-income brackets.63  
Almost one-half (47%) of workers in the United States between 
the ages of twenty five and sixty four are not offered a retirement 
plan at work, and access to an employer-sponsored retirement 
plan varies considerably by income and industry; with the higher 
rates of access found in high-income occupations, including those 
in finance, insurance, and real estate.64 
Evidence shows that higher-income families respond to the 
preferential tax treatment by shifting assets from taxable 
accounts to non-taxable retirement accounts in order to lower 
their taxes.65  Their savings levels are not affected.66  Low- and 
middle-income families, least prepared for retirement, have tax 
rates that are too low to effectively induce them to save more.67  
This reality is compounded by the fact that retirement tax 
expenditures are highly regressive;68 a $100 deduction typically 
 
 61.  GHILARDUCCI, supra note 22, at 162. 
 62.  See Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement 
Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 18565, 2012), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx.  
See also Orazio P. Attanasio & Thomas DeLeire, The Effect of Individual Retirement 
Accounts on Household Consumption and National Saving, 112 ECON. J. 504, 505 
(2002); William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, IRAs and Household Saving, 84 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1233, 1233-34 (1994). 
 63.  Gale & Scholz, supra note 62, at 1234-35. 
 64.  Saad-Lessler et al., supra note 14, at 4-6 (finding that workers’ declining 
bargaining power, along with decreasing firm sizes, serve as the largest factors in the 
drop in sponsorship rates from 61 percent in 1999 to 53 percent in 2011).   
 65.  Chetty et al., supra note 62, at 3, 9, 31. 
 66.  People who do not pay taxes are not eligible for a tax deduction or tax deferral. 
Only if the tax subsidies were in the form of a refundable tax credit would these 
households receive a tax subsidy. 
 67.  Leonard E. Burman et al., Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution 
Plans and Individual Retirement Arrangements, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 684 (2004). 
 68.  Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 4. 
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saves $39.60 for someone in the top income-tax bracket, which is 
39.6%, but only $10 for a low-income worker in the 10% bracket.  
The bottom two quintiles (40%) of the income distribution receive 
only 3% of the tax subsidies for employer-sponsored retirement 
plans.69  In similar fashion, 60% of tax subsidies for employer-
based retirement savings and IRAs go to taxpayers in the top 
quintile (20%) of the income distribution.70 
The regressivity of tax expenditures also compounds each 
year.  All individuals benefit from tax-free accrual, but the higher-
tax-bracket worker generates investment earnings on a larger 
initial contribution and tax break—the tax break is worth 39.6 
cents on the dollar, compared to a low-wage barista who gets a tax 
break of less than 15 cents because she is in a lower tax bracket.  
And, if the tax savings are plowed back into the account, higher-
income workers benefit from even larger tax subsidies.71 
For these and other reasons, experts and the GAO have 
called for periodic and systematic reviews of federal tax 
expenditures to inform policy decisions about their efficiency, 
effectiveness, and equity.72 
IV. CONVERT RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS AND 
DEFERRALS TO CREDITS THAT CAN BE DIRECTLY 
DEPOSITED IN GUARANTEED RETIREMENT 
ACCOUNTS 
If the 2014 retirement tax deferrals were converted to 
refundable tax credits in a revenue-neutral way, all U.S. workers 
would receive an $819 deposit into a retirement account from 
their federal and state governments—if the state has an income 
 
 69.  Batchelder et al., supra note 21, at 54. 
 70.  See C. Eugene Steuerle et al., Who Benefits from Asset-Building Tax 
Subsidies?, URB. INST. (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413241-Who-
Benefits-from-Asset-Building-Tax-Subsidies-.PDF.; see generally CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4308, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM (2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_ 
DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf. 
 71.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 2-4. 
 72.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 49, at 48. Some states, like 
California, have begun to provide information on the purpose and cost of some tax 
expenditures but the scope of these reports remain limited, and very few states are 
following suit. See Leachman et. al., supra note 11, at 45-47; see also Gandhi, supra 
note 50, at 9. 
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tax on earnings.73  This automatic deposit through a refundable 
tax credit would have a larger and more significant impact on 
total savings than policies that rely upon individuals to take 
specific steps to increase their own retirement savings.74  A refund 
is more progressive than a deduction because refundable credits 
do not increase with a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.75 
Transforming the deduction to a refundable tax credit would 
provide 87.8 million workers nationwide, who do not participate 
in a retirement plan at work, with a credit of $647.76  More than 
68 million of these workers are in states with an income tax (see 
Table 3).  As such, these workers’ federal credits would be 
supplemented with an average state credit of $172, which would 
be deposited into their retirement savings accounts (see Table 
3).77 
 
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES OF REFUNDABLE TAX 
CREDITS, NATIONAL AND STATE (2014)78 
 
State Workers Who Do Not 
Participate in an Employer 
Retirement Account 
United States (National) 87,783,000 
Alabama 1,161,452 
Arizona 1,882,631 
Arkansas 796,525 
California 11,051,443 
Colorado 1,548,600 
Connecticut 975,150 
 
 73.  This amount represents the sum of the federal tax expenditure per worker 
($647) and the state tax expenditure per worker ($172). Workers in states that do not 
collect an income tax on earnings would only be eligible for a credit from the federal 
level, while those from states with an income tax on earnings would receive the sum 
of the federal and state tax expenditure as a credit.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 
7, at 4. 
 74.  See Chetty et al., supra note 62, at 4. 
 75.  See Eric Toder & Daniel Baneman, Distributional Effects of Individual 
Income Tax Expenditures: An Update 6 (Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst., Tax Pol’y Ctr., 
Working Paper, 2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412495-
Distribution-of-Tax-Expenditures.pdf. 
 76.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 4. 
 77.  Id. at 4-5, 13. 
 78.  Id. at 5 (Table 3). 
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Delaware 251,340 
Georgia 2,587,337 
Hawaii 347,076 
Idaho 452,855 
Illinois 3,521,499 
Indiana 1,711,644 
Iowa 880,627 
Kansas 818,203 
Kentucky 1,150,307 
Louisiana 1,311,329 
Maine 388,252 
Maryland 1,528,903 
Massachusetts 1,871,068 
Michigan 2,617,841 
Minnesota 1,509,685 
Mississippi 728,207 
Missouri 1,690,669 
Montana 311,404 
Nebraska 578,024 
New Jersey 2,433,660 
New Mexico 612,203 
New York 5,307,365 
North Carolina 2,747,885 
North Dakota 231,292 
Ohio 3,159,542 
Oklahoma 1,048,392 
Oregon 1,088,922 
Pennsylvania 3,358,076 
Rhode Island 291,700 
South Carolina 1,223,594 
Utah 846,416 
Vermont 199,230 
Virginia 2,213,049 
West Virginia 398,006 
Wisconsin 1,588,315 
District of Columbia 175,737  
 
Table 3 shows the total number of workers, at the state and 
federal levels that would benefit from a refundable credit for 
retirement.  In more than half (twenty-four) of the forty two states 
listed, one million workers (or more) who do not participate in a 
retirement plan at work stand to benefit from a retirement credit.  
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In large states like California, this figure rises to eleven million 
workers, while five million workers would benefit in New York. 
One example of how the refundable tax credits will help 
workers save can be illustrated in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, where the combined refundable tax credit (state 
and federal) will amount to $964 (see Table 8).  All workers in the 
state of Massachusetts would have this combined credit directly 
and annually deposited into their retirement accounts.  If we fast-
forward the same reinvestment process for forty working years 
and assume an annualized rate of return of 2%, the average 
worker in Massachusetts who does not participate in a retirement 
plan will have saved more than $58,000 by 2054.  This figure is 
higher than the median account balance of a near-retiree today 
who has access to an IRA or 401(k) plan at work.79 
In a second example, a worker from the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania would have a combined refundable credit of $830.  
If we fast-forward the same yearly process of reinvestment as 
above for forty working years, and apply a more advantageous 
annual return of 5%, the average worker in Pennsylvania who 
starts with no savings will have saved approximately $100,264 by 
2054.  This same exercise can be performed with each of the forty 
two states (including Washington, D.C.) with an income tax on 
earnings. 
The uniform refundable tax credits we propose in this Study 
should be part of a comprehensive retirement and savings reform 
that includes the creation of new, low-cost savings vehicles.  
Guaranteed Retirement Accounts (GRAs), as advocated by 
Ghilarducci in previous writings, could be such a vehicle.80  GRAs 
are “individual, ‘cash-balance’ accounts, where benefits at 
retirement are based solely on contributions and returns.”81  
Additionally, GRAs would guarantee a rate of return above 
inflation to protect workers from the volatility of the stock market, 
and “[a]ll individual account assets would be invested together in 
one large pool, with an emphasis on low-risk, long-term gains.”82  
Individual employees and the government could also fund GRAs 
by having the refundable credits directly deposited into workers’ 
 
 79.  See Joelle Saad-Lessler et al., supra note 14, at 13-14. 
 80.  Teresa Ghilarducci et al., State Guaranteed Retirement Accounts: A Low-Cost, 
Secure Solution to America’s Retirement Crisis, DEMOS & SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. 
POLICY ANALYSIS 3 (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/StateGRAReport-1.pdf. 
 81.  Id.   
 82.  Id.   
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savings accounts.83  At no extra cost to employers, the state, or the 
federal government, these reforms, GRAs and refundable tax 
credits combined, will expand the reach of a secure and dignified 
retirement for all workers.84 
V. CONCLUSION 
Tax breaks for retirement savings accounts made up the 
third largest federal tax expenditure in 2014.85  These tax breaks 
also cause substantial, but opaque, losses to state treasuries.  In 
this Study, we have estimated and assembled the costs of 
retirement tax expenditures at the state level.  The loss is of 
nearly $20 billion per year. 
Transforming retirement tax expenditures into refundable 
tax credits at the federal and state levels would lead to more 
equitable and expanded retirement security for working- and 
middle-class families.  These tax credits could be automatically 
deposited into workers’ retirement savings GRA accounts.  If the 
deductions were credits today, more than eighty million workers 
nationwide without retirement accounts would have more than 
$800 deposited in a retirement savings account.  Over forty years, 
and assuming an annualized rate of 3.5%, these accounts would 
yield over $70,000 per worker.  The transition from tax deductions 
to refundable tax credits would add no extra costs to the budget 
of employers, the states, or the federal government.  However, 
such a reform would finally make real the promise of a secure 
retirement for all workers in the United States. 
 
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY OF COMPUTING STATE TAX 
EXPENDITURES 
This Study uses the Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures 
for Fiscal Years 2014-2018 report (JCT Report),86 prepared by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation, as its baseline for categorizing and 
calculating state tax expenditures on retirement.  This Study also 
uses provisions in federal tax legislation, enacted up to June 30, 
2014.87  The JCT Report notes that, a tax expenditure is 
 
 83.  Id. at 16.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 21, 32. 
 86.  See generally id. 
 87.  Id. at 1 
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calculated by the difference between current law tax liability and 
that which would result if the provision were revoked, which 
allows taxpayers to benefit from any of the remaining provisions 
applicable to the income or expenses associated with the revoked 
tax expenditure.88 
The Treasury’s Office of Management of the Budget (OMB) 
also releases tax expenditure estimates each year.89  Due to 
disparate assumptions and methodology, OMB estimates are 
larger than those released by the JCT ($146.4 billion versus $94.6 
billion, respectively).90  This Study uses JCT estimates.  The 
difference between retirement tax expenditure estimates released 
by the OMB and the JCT is discussed further in previous work by 
Teresa Ghilarducci,91 and in Part I of the JCT report, under the 
heading, “Comparisons with Treasury.”92 
The OMB also reports discounted present-value estimations, 
which are treated as more accurately reflecting the true economic 
cost of tax provisions.93  The total present-value estimate for 
retirement tax expenditures in the OMB report is $101.3 billion.94  
This figure “represents the revenue effects, net of future tax 
payments, which follow from activities undertaken during 
calendar year 2014 which cause the deferrals.”95  For example, 
pension contribution in 2014 would cause a deferral of tax 
payments on wages in the same year.  Such deferrals would also 
be on pension fund earnings on these contributions in later years.  
When the worker retires, these same 2014 pension contributions 
and accrued earnings will be distributed to workers and taxes on 
these amounts will be due.  These additional taxes are included 
in the OMB’s $101.3 billion estimate,96 and explain the higher tax 
expenditure number reached by the OMB compared to that 
calculated by the JCT. 
We use the lower number presented by the JCT ($94.6 
 
 88.  Id. at 13. 
 89.  See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1. 
 90.  Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 226, with Ghilarducci 
et al., supra note 7, at 1. 
 91.  See Teresa Ghilarducci, Calculating Retirement Tax Expenditures: 2010, 
SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS (2011), 
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/
Calculating_Retirement_Tax_Expenditures.pdf. 
 92.  J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
 93.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 243. 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 7. 
 96.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 220. 
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billion) so as to not exaggerate the revenue losses.  We use this 
number under the understanding that the individual state tax 
expenditure reports we examine provide cash-based, not present-
value, estimates.97  Because this figure is lower than both OMB 
estimates (the cash-based and present-values), our Study may 
actually underestimate the true cost of retirement tax 
expenditures. 
Retirement tax expenditures in the JCT Report fall under the 
following main categories: “Net exclusion of pension contributions 
and earnings,” “Individual retirement arrangements,” and 
“Credit for certain individuals for elective deferrals and IRA 
contributions.”  The net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings category consists of plans covering partners and sole 
proprietors, DB plans, and DC plans.  Among the individual 
retirement arrangements category are listed traditional IRAs and 
Roth IRAs.98 
A. DERIVING ESTIMATES FOR STATES THAT PUBLISH TAX 
EXPENDITURE REPORTS 
The state figures for retirement tax expenditures are 
calculated using the tax expenditure reports released by each 
state.99  Forty-two states (including Washington, D.C.) have an 
earnings income tax.100  The states of New Hampshire and 
 
 97.  See generally J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6. 
 98.  Id. at 32. 
 99.  Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 7. 
 100.  Id. The following illustrate the authors’ investigations of each state report 
and the computation of a census: 
See CAL. DEP’T. OF FIN., TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT 2014-15 (2015); D.C. OFF. OF 
REVENUE ANALYSIS, D.C. TAX EXPENDITURE REP. (May 2014); GA. DEP’T. OF AUDITS & 
ACCTS., GEORGIA TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT FOR FY 2016 (Dec. 2014); IOWA DEP’T. OF 
REVENUE, 2010 IOWA TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY: FINAL RELEASE (Nov. 2014); KY. 
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE FOR ECON. ANALYSIS: OFFICE OF THE STATE BUDGET DIR., TAX 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, FISCAL YEARS 2014-2016 (2014); DEP’T. OF ADMIN. & FIN. 
SERVS., ME. REVENUE SERVS., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, MAINE STATE TAX EXPENDITURE 
REPORT 2014-2015 (2013); EXEC. OFFICE FOR ADMIN. & FIN., COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASS., TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2015 (Jan. 2014); MICH. DEP’T. OF 
TREASURY, EXECUTIVE BUDGET APPENDIX ON TAX CREDITS, DEDUCTIONS, AND 
EXEMPTIONS, FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015 (2014); MINN. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, TAX 
RESEARCH DIV., STATE OF MINNESOTA TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, FISCAL YEARS 2014-
2017 (Feb. 2014); MONT. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, BIENNIAL REPORT, JULY 1, 2012-JUNE 30, 
2014 (2014); N.Y DIV. OF THE BUDGET, DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., FY 2016 ANNUAL 
REPORT ON NEW YORK STATE TAX EXPENDITURES (2014); N.C. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, 
REVENUE RESEARCH DIV., NORTH CAROLINA BIENNIAL TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT 
(Dec. 2013); OR. DEP’T. OF ADMIN. SERVS., STATE OF OREGON TAX EXPENDITURE 
REPORT 2015-2017 (2015); PA. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, 2015-2016 PENNSYLVANIA 
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Tennessee collect an income tax that applies to interest and 
dividend income only.101  Of the seven states that do not collect an 
income tax, two states (Texas and Florida) are very large in 
geographical size, one state (Washington) is medium in 
geographical size, and the remaining three (Nevada, South 
Dakota, Wyoming) are very small—but only in terms of 
population size.102 
Of the forty two states that collect an income tax on earnings, 
thirty nine publish a tax expenditure report.103  Of these thirty 
nine states (including Washington, D.C.), only eighteen estimate 
costs of the tax preference for “tax-qualified retirement 
accounts.”104  There are obvious differences—size, region, 
politically Democratic or Republican—between these three 
groups of states.  Less obvious, but very important, differences 
also exist: (1) states (three in total) that collect an income tax, and 
that presumably allow for deductions and exclusions, but do not 
publish a tax expenditure report; (2) states (twenty one, in total) 
that account for the cost of total tax expenditures in reports, but 
offer no details on retirement expenditures; and (3) states 
(eighteen, in total)105 that publish the cost of retirement account 
preferential treatments.106  Further study on these groups would 
have to determine whether the eighteen states that do publish 
reports of cost estimates are more sophisticated, careful, 
transparent, and exhibit other characteristics of good 
government.107 
We make the distinction among the three groups of states 
here only to further distinguish between states for which we 
estimated tax expenditures and those for which we report their 
estimates.  Of the eighteen states that report retirement tax 
expenditures, we estimate tax expenditure values for Kansas, 
 
EXECUTIVE BUDGET (2015); R.I. DEPT. OF REVENUE, OFFICE OF REVENUE ANALYSIS, 
2014 TAX EXPENDITURES REPORT (May 15, 2014); WIS. DEP’T. OF REVENUE & DEP’T OF 
ADMIN., STATE OF WISCONSIN SUMMARY OF TAX EXEMPTION DEVICES (Feb. 2013). 
 101.  Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 17. 
 102.  See generally id., supra note 7. 
 103.  Id. at 8. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  The 18 states that publish a tax expenditure report for retirement accounts 
include: California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Montana, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, 
Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (June 1, 
2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-
part-time-legislatures.aspx. 
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Mississippi, and Rhode Island.  Kansas, for example, “does not 
publish estimates for net exclusions of private pension 
contributions and earnings.”108  Additionally, the state of 
Mississippi does not provide estimates with respect to 
contributions to employee pension plans.109  Rhode Island, for its 
part, does not specify whether it includes “deferred earnings from 
retirement plans and contributions to public pensions or private 
[DB] plans.”110  The final fifteen states we find with reliable tax 
expenditure calculations are: California, District of Columbia, 
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
Not all of the above fifteen states provide complete estimates 
of retirement tax expenditures in their reports.111  Each state 
provides distinct categories that are not comparable.  
Pennsylvania, for example, only provides estimates for employer-
made retirement contributions.112  Additionally, Massachusetts 
provides estimates for deductions of employee contributions to 
public pension plans, but listed as part of the total under the 
category of “Deduction for Employee Social Security and Railroad 
Retirement Payments.”113  Since this combined estimate would 
have overstated the cost of retirement tax expenditures for 
Massachusetts, deductions of employee contributions to public 
pensions were left out of our calculation.  The bottom line is that, 
where we have had to make a judgment call for the purposes of 
this article, we erred on the side of underreporting. 
B. ESTIMATING RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES PER 
WORKER FOR STATES THAT DO NOT PUBLISH ESTIMATES 
Importantly, “[t]he majority of states do not report lost 
revenue from favoring activities in the tax code.”114  In this 
subpart, we provide estimates for the remaining twenty seven 
states that collect an income tax on earnings, but that do not 
publish reliable estimates.115 
 
 108.  This is the author’s own count and analysis of the state reports.  See 
Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 8. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 8. 
 115.  We follow the methodology used by authors in the following source: Lauren 
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We begin by calculating the mean contribution an average 
worker makes to their private account (see Table 4).  Here, we also 
make the assumption that the typical employer contributes 2.1% 
of each worker’s pay, while the typical worker contributes 6% of 
their salary.116 
 
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION PER WORKER 
IN 2014117 
 
State Annual 
Mean 
Wage 
(2014) 
Estimated 
Employee 
Contribution 
Estimated 
Employer 
Contribution 
Estimated 
Contribution 
Per Worker* 
Alabama $40,879 6.0% 2.1% $3,311 
Arizona $45,075 6.0% 2.1% $3,651 
Arkansas $37,933 6.0% 2.1% $3,073 
Colorado $49,727 6.0% 2.1% $4,028 
Connecticut $55,274 6.0% 2.1% $4,477 
Delaware $50,042 6.0% 2.1% $4,053 
Hawaii $46,141 6.0% 2.1% $3,737 
Idaho $39,457 6.0% 2.1% $3,196 
Illinois $48,437 6.0% 2.1% $3,923 
Indiana $41,428 6.0% 2.1% $3,356 
Kansas $41,895 6.0% 2.1% $3,393 
 
Schmitz & Teresa Ghilarducci, New York City and State Tax Expenditures for Defined 
Contribution Plans (Schwartz Ctr. for Econ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 2012-
2, 2012), 
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/WP
%202012-2%20Lauren%20Schmitz.pdf.  See generally id. at 1-2 (providing “Executive 
Summary” of authors’ estimates for those states that do not publish dependable 
estimates). 
 116.  See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUDE ́N, COMING UP SHORT: THE 
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 29-31, 58-61 (2004); see also David Wray, 401(k) Sponsors 
Increase Focus on Plan Investments, PLAN SPONSOR COUNCIL OF AM. (Sept. 16, 2010), 
http://www.psca.org/401-k-sponsors-increase-focus-on-plan-investments. 
 117.  Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 9 (2014 annual mean wage calculated using 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 2013 State Occupational Employment and Wage 
Estimates. Those estimates were converted into 2014 dollars with BLS Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) data. States are listed in alphabetical order.). See Occupational 
Employment Statistics, May 2014 State Occupational Employment and Wage 
Estimates, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oessrcst.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); see also CPI 
Detailed Report, Data for January 2015, U.S. Dep’t. of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., 
www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1501.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2016). 
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Louisiana $40,137 6.0% 2.1% $3,251 
Maryland $53,689 6.0% 2.1% $,349 
Mississippi $36,643 6.0% 2.1% $2,968 
Missouri $42,687 6.0% 2.1% $3,458 
Nebraska $40,849 6.0% 2.1% $3,309 
New Jersey $53,638 6.0% 2.1% $4,345 
New 
Mexico 
$42,129 6.0% 2.1% $3,412 
North 
Dakota 
$43,083 6.0% 2.1% $3,490 
Ohio $43,856 6.0% 2.1% $3,552 
Oklahoma $40,574 6.0% 2.1% $3,287 
Rhode 
Island 
$49,595 6.0% 2.1% $4,017 
South 
Carolina 
$39,609 6.0% 2.1% $3,208 
Utah $43,419 6.0% 2.1% $3,517 
Vermont $44,760 6.0% 2.1% $3,626 
Virginia $50,916 6.0% 2.1% $4,124 
West 
Virginia 
$38,146 6.0% 2.1% $3,090 
*Product of the sum of both contribution and the annual 
mean wage. 
Table 4 provides estimates of the average retirement account 
contribution per worker in 2014 for states that do not publish 
reliable estimates.  The estimated contribution per worker is 
expressed as a function of each state’s mean wage, the average 
employee contribution to a private retirement account, and that 
of the employer, as a share of a worker’s pay. 
In Table 5 (below), we multiply the derived mean 
contributions by the median tax rate for the state.  This is done in 
order to develop an estimate of the tax expenditure per employee 
or worker. 
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TABLE 5. 2014 ESTIMATED RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURE 
PER WORKER IN EACH STATE118 
 
State Estimated 
Contribution 
Per Worker 
Median 
Statutory  
Tax Rate 
(2014) 
Estimated 
Retirement 
Expenditure 
Per Worker 
(2014) 
Alabama $3,311 4.00% $132 
Arizona $3,651 3.36% $123 
Arkansas $3,073 4.00% $123 
Colorado $4,028 4.63% $186 
Connecticut $4,477 5.75% $257 
Delaware $4,053 5.00% $203 
Hawaii $3,737 7.40% $277 
Idaho $3,196 5.10% $163 
Illinois $3,923 5.00% $196 
Indiana $3,356 3.40% $114 
Kansas $3,393 3.75% $127 
Louisiana $3,251 4.00% $130 
Maryland $4,349 4.87% $212 
Mississippi $2,968 4.00% $119 
Missouri $3,458 3.75% $130 
Nebraska $3,309 8.52% $282 
New Jersey $4,345 4.51% $196 
New Mexico $3,412 3.95% $135 
North Dakota $3,490 2.52% $88 
Ohio $3,552 3.22% $114 
Oklahoma $3,287 3.00% $99 
Rhode Island $4,017 4.75% $191 
South Carolina $3,208 4.50% $144 
Utah $3,517 5.00% $176 
Vermont $3,626 7.80% $283 
Virginia $4,124 4.00% $165 
West Virginia $3,090 4.50% $139 
 
Table 5 provides our estimated retirement tax expenditure 
per worker for 2014.  The states listed above are those that do not 
publish reliable estimates of their own.  The state retirement tax 
 
 118.  Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 10. 
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expenditure per worker is expressed as a function of the 
previously estimated mean contribution per worker in each state 
and the state’s median statutory tax rate. 
It is important to note that by using the median tax rate, our 
figures, by and large, underestimate the per-worker tax 
expenditures for retirement.  Retirement plan contributions swell 
significantly for workers in the highest income brackets.119  Our 
undervaluing is evidenced by the fact that, in our calculation, only 
three states generate figures larger than what we observed 
published in their respective tax expenditure reports.120 
In Table 6, we multiply the per-worker tax expenditure for 
retirement at the state level by the share of workers in the state 
who participate in an employer-provided or employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, and further by the total number of workers in 
the state in 2014. 
 
TABLE 6. 2014 ESTIMATED TOTAL RETIREMENT TAX 
EXPENDITURE PER STATE121 
 
State Estimated 
Retirement 
Expenditure 
Per Worker 
(2014) 
2014 
Employment 
Level  
(Annual 
Average) 
Fraction of 
Workers 
Who 
Participate 
in an 
Employer-
Sponsored 
Retirement 
Plan (2012) 
Estimated 
Total 
Retirement 
Tax 
Expenditure 
for 2014 
Alabama $132 2,013,000 0.42 $112,785,823 
Arizona $123 2,869,000 0.34 $121,002,756 
Arkansas $123 1,218,000 0.35 $51,800,446 
Colorado $186 2,670,000 0.42 $209,132,532 
Connecticut $257 1,773,000 0.45 $205,397,511 
Delaware $203 426,000 0.41 $35,398,530 
 
 119.  Id. at 8. 
 120.  This study ultimately gives priority to estimates derived from tax expenditure 
reports in the states that publish them.  Id. 
 121.  Participation rates are calculated from March 2013 Current Population 
Survey data for U.S. workers. Employment levels per state are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. States are listed in alphabetical order.  Id. at 11. 
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Hawaii $277 639,000 0.46 $80,737,496 
Idaho $163 735,000 0.38 $45,988,492 
Illinois $196 6,065,000 0.43 $498,959,734 
Indiana $114 3,047,000 0.44 $152,352,803 
Kansas $127 1,434,000 0.43 $78,363,652 
Louisiana $130 2,021,000 0.35 $92,289,333 
Maryland $212 2,915,000 0.48 $293,558,700 
Mississippi $119 1,136,000 0.36 $48,414,308 
Missouri $130 2,857,000 0.41 $151,229,468 
Nebraska $282 984,000 0.41 $114,446,275 
New Jersey $196 4,223,000 0.42 $350,615,243 
New Mexico $135 851,000 0.28 $32,187,460 
North 
Dakota 
$88 409,000 0.43 $15,627,995 
Ohio $114 5,398,000 0.41 $256,043,750 
Oklahoma $99 1,693,000 0.38 $63,555,342 
Rhode Island $191 511,000 0.43 $41,846,348 
South 
Carolina 
$144 2,063,000 0.41 $121,189,494 
Utah $176 1,372,000 0.38 $92,421,733 
Vermont $283 333,000 0.40 $37,829,036 
Virginia $165 4,053,000 0.45 $303,532,120 
West 
Virginia 
$139 741,000 0.46 $47,690,959 
 
Table 6 provides the estimated total cost, in 2014, of 
retirement tax expenditures for states that do not publish 
workable and reliable estimates of their own.  Total state costs of 
retirement tax expenditures are expressed as a function of per-
worker tax expenditure for retirement in each state, the share of 
works in the state who participate in an employer-provided or 
employer-sponsored retirement plan, and the total number of 
workers in the state for 2014. 
C. DERIVING THE REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT PER WORKER 
To generate the per-worker refundable tax credits at the 
federal level, we divide the total tax expenditures for retirement 
from the JCT report by the yearly average employment level in 
the United States in 2014.122 
 
 122.  Id. at 12. 
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Federal Per Worker Retirement Tax Expenditure:  
 
2014 Total Tax Expenditures for Retirement 
2014 Annual  Level of Employment
 
 
$94,600,000,000 
146,305,000
 = $647 
 
We follow a similar methodology to derive estimates for per-
worker refundable tax credits at the state level (see Table 8). 
Table 7 provides the latest annual figures we had available 
for our calculations in this Study: 
 
TABLE 7. ANNUAL DATA UTILIZED TO DERIVE ESTIMATES FOR 
STATES123 
 
State Retirement Tax 
Expenditures* 
Annual 
Employment 
Statistics 
California FY 2014-2015 2014 
New York FY 2015-2016 2014 
Pennsylvania FY 2014-2015 2014 
Georgia 2014 2014 
North Carolina FY 2014-2015 2014 
Michigan FY 2014 2014 
Massachusetts FY 2015 2014 
Wisconsin 2012 2012 
Minnesota FY 2014 2014 
Kentucky FY 2014 2014 
Oregon FY 2013-2015 2014 
Iowa 2010 2010 
Maine FY 2014 2014 
Montana FY 2013 2013 
District of Columbia FY 2014 2014 
*All retirement tax expenditure estimates derive from tax expenditure reports 
for the listed fiscal years. 
For each state, we reviewed the latest tax expenditure 
reports available.  The annual employment statistics used as 
 
 123.  Figure used for Oregon is half of the estimate for the 2013-2015 period, given 
that Oregon’s tax expenditure report is published every other year. Id. 
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denominators in each fraction was determined by the fiscal year 
of the report reviewed. 
Table 8 illustrates the estimated refundable credit per state.  
The average refundable credit at the state level (for all forty-two 
states surveyed) is derived by dividing the total tax expenditures 
for retirement in all states by the total number of workers in all 
states.  This calculation yields a mean (state level) refundable tax 
credit of $172. 
 
TABLE 8. ESTIMATED REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS (2014)124 
 
State State Tax 
Expenditures 
Employment 
Level (2014) 
Refundable 
Tax Credit 
National  $94,600,000,000 146,305,000 $647 
All States $19,910,797,336 115,783,000 $172 
Alabama $112,785,823 2,013,000 $56 
Arizona $121,002,756 2,869,000 $42 
Arkansas $51,800,446 1,218,000 $43 
California $5,170,000,000 17,298,000 $299 
Colorado $209,132,532 2,670,000 $78 
Connecticut $205,397,511 1,773,000 $116 
Delaware $35,398,530 426,000 $83 
Georgia $711,000,000 4,371,000 $163 
Hawaii $80,737,496 639,000 $126 
Idaho $45,988,492 735,000 $63 
Illinois $498,959,734 6,065,000 $82 
Indiana $152,352,803 3,047,000 $50 
Iowa $530,000,000 1,633,000 $318 
Kansas $78,363,652 1,434,000 $55 
Kentucky $539,000,000 1,876,000 $287 
Louisiana $92,289,333 2,021,000 $46 
Maine $162,000,000 656,000 $247 
Maryland $293,558,700 2,915,000 $101 
Massachusetts $1,060,000,000 3,349,000 $317 
Michigan $946,000,000 4,408,000 $215 
Minnesota $881,000,000 2,855,000 $309 
Mississippi $48,414,308 1,136,000 $43 
Missouri $151,229,468 2,857,000 $53 
 
 124.  Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 13. 
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Montana $159,000,000 500,000 $318 
Nebraska $114,446,275 984,000 $116 
New Jersey $350,615,243 4,223,000 $83 
New Mexico $32,187,460 851,000 $38 
New York $2,826,000,000 8,946,000 $316 
North Carolina $914,000,000 4,354,000 $210 
North Dakota $15,627,995 409,000 $38 
Ohio $256,043,750 5,398,000 $47 
Oklahoma $63,555,342 1,693,000 $38 
Oregon $411,000,000 1,801,000 $228 
Pennsylvania $1,100,300,000 6,018,000 $183 
Rhode Island $41,846,348 511,000 $82 
South Carolina $121,189,494 2,063,000 $59 
Utah $92,421,733 1,372,000 $67 
Vermont $37,829,036 333,000 $114 
Virginia $303,532,120 4,053,000 $75 
West Virginia $47,690,959 741,000 $64 
Wisconsin $730,100,000 2,920,000 $250 
District of 
Columbia 
$127,000,000 349,000 $364 
 
Table 8 provides estimates of the size of the refundable tax 
credit for retirement in each of the forty-two states (including 
Washington, D.C.) that collect an income tax on earnings.  This 
figure is expressed as the quotient of the total cost of retirement 
expenditures in a state and the total number of workers in that 
state. 
D. CALCULATING NUMBER OF WORKERS ABLE TO TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF A REFUNDABLE CREDIT 
To estimate the number of workers in each state who would 
benefit from the conversion of retirement tax expenditures into 
refundable tax credits, we first calculate the fraction of workers 
who do not participate in a retirement plan at work (or through 
their union) in each state.125  We then multiply this fraction by 
the 2014 annual average employment level for each state, in order 
 
 125.  Participation in a retirement plan at work requires the employer to offer a 
retirement plan to their workers and for workers to be eligible and to choose to 
participate in such a plan.  See John Turner et al., Defining Participation in Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 36-37, 
42 (Aug. 2003), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/08/art3full.pdf. 
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to arrive at the number of workers who are not participating in a 
retirement plan at work in each state and who are, therefore, not 
benefitting from the current retirement tax incentive.  In other 
words, these are the workers who stand to benefit from converting 
retirement tax expenditures into refundable tax credits (see Table 
9). 
 
 
TABLE 9. NUMBER OF WORKERS WHO STAND TO BENEFIT 
FROM REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 126 
 
State Fraction of 
Workers  
Who do Not 
Participate in 
an Employer-
Sponsored 
Retirement 
Plan (2012) 
2014 
Employment 
Level (Annual 
Average) 
Number of 
Workers Who 
do Not 
Participate in 
an Employer-
Sponsored 
Retirement 
Plan as of 
2014 
United States 
(National) 
0.60 146,305,000 87,783,000 
Alabama 0.58 2,013,000 1,161,452 
Arizona 0.66 2,869,000 1,882,631 
Arkansas 0.65 1,218,000 796,525 
California 0.64 17,298,000 11,051,443 
Colorado 0.58 2,670,000 1,548,600 
Connecticut 0.55 1,773,000 975,150 
Delaware 0.59 426,000 251,340 
Georgia 0.59 4,371,000 2,587,337 
Hawaii 0.54 639,000 347,076 
Idaho 0.62 735,000 452,855 
Illinois 0.58 6,065,000 3,521,499 
Indiana 0.56 3,047,000 1,711,644 
Iowa 0.54 1,633,000 880,627 
Kansas 0.57 1,434,000 818,203 
 
 126.  Participation rates are calculated from March 2013 Current Population 
Survey data for U.S. workers. Employment levels per state are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. States are sorted by decreasing the size of their employment level. 
See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 15. 
GHILARDUCCIFINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2016  7:54 AM 
122     BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.1 
Kentucky 0.61 1,876,000 1,150,307 
Louisiana 0.65 2,021,000 1,311,329 
Maine 0.59 656,000 388,252 
Maryland 0.52 2,915,000 1,528,903 
Massachusetts 0.56 3,349,000 1,871,068 
Michigan 0.59 4,408,000 2,617,841 
Minnesota 0.53 2,855,000 1,509,685 
Mississippi 0.64 1,136,000 728,2070 
Missouri 0.59 2,857,000 1,690,669 
Montana 0.62 500,000 311,404 
Nebraska 0.59 984,000 578,024 
New Jersey 0.58 4,223,000 2,433,660 
New Mexico 0.72 851,000 612,203 
New York 0.59 8,946,000 5,307,365 
North Carolina 0.63 4,354,000 2,747,885 
North Dakota 0.57 409,000 231,292 
Ohio 0.59 5,398,000 3,159,542 
Oklahoma 0.62 1,693,000 1,048,392 
Oregon 0.60 1,801,000 1,088,922 
Pennsylvania 0.56 6,018,000 3,358,076 
Rhode Island 0.57 511,000 291,700 
South Carolina 0.59 2,063,000 1,223,594 
Utah 0.62 1,372,000 846,416 
Vermont 0.60 333,000 199,230 
Virginia 0.55 4,053,000 2,213,049 
West Virginia 0.54 741,000 398,006 
Wisconsin 0.54 2,920,000 1,588,315 
District of 
Columbia 
0.50 349,000 175,737 
 
Table 9 estimates the total number of workers, in each state, 
who stand to benefit from a retirement credit.  At the federal level, 
87.7 million workers stand to benefit from the conversion of the 
deduction to a credit.  The majority of the beneficiaries, 68.6 
million, are from states that collect an income tax on earnings.  
These 68.6 million workers will also qualify for state credits, 
which would supplement the federal credit of $647. 
 
